Ludwig von Doederlein
Döderlein's Hand-book of Latin Synonymes
INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN EDITION
Dr. Ludwig Döderlein, the author of this work, was born in 1791, and became Professor in the University of Erlangen. He is an eminent philologist, and the author of several valuable philological works. The most important of these are: “The Formation of Latin Words;” “A Homeric Glossary;” “Handbook of Latin Etymology;” “Latin Synonymes and Etymologies,” in six volumes; on this he labored more than twelve years, the first volume appearing in 1826, the last in 1828. From this latter work, the volume here presented was prepared by the author, and first published in 1840. After a familiarity of several years with most of the best manuals on Latin Synonymes, we find this superior to any of them, and better adapted to the wants of the student. It shows an intimate and comprehensive acquaintance with the language, and a nice discrimination between the significations of words having a greater or less similarity of meaning. The distinctions are generally well founded, and clearly stated. While at times the distinction may seem to be too refined and subtle, careful observation and more extended study will usually correct such an impression. The difference between related words may proceed from a variety of sources. It may be that of genus and species; or it may be historical, one being used at one time and the other at a different one; or one is abstract, the other concrete; one is literal, the other figurative; one is the more common expression, the other the more elegant; one is a prose word, the other poetical; one belongs to one kind of poetry, and the other to another. The difference also consists in the point of view which the writer takes. Quies is rest; requies also is rest; but the latter word shows that the writer has in mind a previous state of unrest. There are other differences also growing out of the essential nature of the words.
The advantages of the study of synonymes in a classical course, are too great to be neglected. A knowledge of them gives to the student a fulness and precision of his author’s meaning otherwise unattainable. The point of a sentence often turns upon a delicate shade of thought conveyed by a particular word, which another of similar signification would not give; if this delicate shade is not appreciated, the writer’s thought is either misapprehended, or but imperfectly understood.
Again, the habit of observing the proper use of words related to each other in meaning, as whether one is generic, and the other specific, one abstract, the other concrete, one literal, the other figurative, or whatever be the ground and nature of the difference, is one of the essential benefits of classical study. The whole process of such study, when rightly conducted, is that of “arbitrating between conflicting probabilities;” and the closest power of arbitration is often requisite in determining the particular idea conveyed by related words. Or, if the distinctions are drawn out, as they are in a treatise on synonymes, the mind of the student is trained to close and discriminating observation, in being required to note and fix these distinctions, and to give a definite form to them in his own mind, and to express them in his own language.
Besides the more direct advantages resulting from the study of synonymes, an increased interest will thereby be given to classical studies There is a natural fondness in the youthful mind for the process of comparison, for tracing resemblances and differences. This element should not be neglected when it can be turned to so good account. It will help to relieve the tedium and barrenness of classical study, as too often conducted, and to give some living features to languages which are too generally looked upon as “dead.”
The meaning of a particular word is often given more distinctly by stating its opposite. The relation, or shade of thought, which cannot be conveyed fully by a direct definition, nor perhaps, indeed, by words at all, is made clear and distinct by showing to what it is opposed. This valuable means of elucidation, the author has used with great success in this work.
While the author has “omitted all detail in the treatment of Greek synonymes” in this compend, he has very wisely sought out the nearest corresponding Greek expression, and placed it with the Latin word to be explained. Thus the Greek word, to the more advanced scholar, will often throw light upon the Latin, and the Latin in turn upon the Greek. In this way the work is indirectly valuable in elucidating Greek synonymes.
The present edition of this work is reprinted from the second London edition, which is essentially the same as the first, with a few corrections and improvements.
S. H. T.Andover, January, 1858.
THE AUTHOR’S PREFACE
The wish has been expressed to me from different quarters, and particularly by several respectable schoolmasters, to see the essential results of my larger work on Latin Synonymes and Etymologies compressed into a Hand-book. Although within the twelve years since I began to work at the long-neglected study of Latin Synonymes, the market has been almost glutted with works of the same sort, in the form of hand-books, by Habicht, Ramshorn, Jentzen, and Schmalfeld, I have not, on that acount, the least hesitation in complying with the wish expressed to me, by publishing the present Abridgment; for, in asserting that my method and the arrangement of my materials are totally distinct from what have been adopted by those deserving authors, I trust that I am neither extolling myself, nor underrating them. The Abridgment which I here submit to the Public contains, I hope, all that is essential in my larger work; – to effect which object I have omitted certain things of less direct importance; namely, —
First, – All etymological deductions. Not wishing, however, entirely to renounce my principle of associating the etymology with the synonyme, I have inserted it between parentheses, whenever it was not either so obvious as to make the insertion unnecessary, or so far-fetched as to make the etymology doubtful. Many instances of this sort will and must, especially to him who is not conversant with etymological researches, appear singularly uncouth; but it would have led me too far to refer, in every instance, to the principles established in the Treatise on the Formation of Latin Words, which I have subjoined to my larger work as a Supplement. I must, therefore, entreat those readers and critics into whose hands my treatise has not fallen, to ignore (if I may use a law term) the words included between parentheses, or to suspend their verdict concerning them.
Secondly, – I have omitted all parallel passages, and such as have an affinity with each other, without possessing any stringent force as proofs. On the other hand, I have given at length those passages in the classics in which the ancients, in the course of speech, and not by means of grammatical reflections, have introduced synonymes in contrast with each other, and thus taught their differences; and where such passages were wanting, I have frequently brought into juxta-position several passages from one and the same author, in which he seems to have indicated some peculiar force in a particular expression.
Thirdly, – I have omitted all critical and exegetical discussions. The more scientific form of my larger work not only afforded me the opportunity, but imposed the obligation of entering upon such discussions; but in the present Abridgment I have thought it best, except in a very few cases, to omit them altogether.
Fourthly, – I have omitted all detail in the treatment of the Greek synonymes. Nevertheless, I have thought it of essential importance to search for the nearest corresponding expression, both in the Greek and German languages, and place them by the side of the Latin synonyme; and at the same time to ascertain, and make intuitive, as it were, the precise meaning and extent of the Latin expression, by the introduction of such words as are strictly in opposition to it.
Fifthly, – I have omitted the views of other writers on synonymes. In my larger work I introduced, often only as literary curiosities, distinctions derived from the Latin grammarians, Varro, Cicero, Agrætius, Pseudo-fronto, and Pseudo-palæmon; and I also quoted, whether agreeing with or differing from me, the modern writers on synonymes, Popma, Hill, Dumesnil, Smitson, Habicht, Ramshorn, Jentzen, and others. Instead of which I must here content myself with merely referring to such quotations as are contained in my larger work; and have therefore added, at the end of each article, the volume and page of that work in which these quotations are to be found.
Sixthly, – I have omitted such synonymes as are of very rare occurrence, and distinguished from each other by a very slight difference. In my larger work I have treated as synonymes many expressions, ἅπαξ εἰρημένα, that occur but once, and whose differences, on that very account, cannot be deduced from the general usage of the language, but can merely be guessed at from etymology and other sources. Such expressions are of no importance with reference to the object of this Hand-book. The same may be said of many synonymes which can be distinguished, as it were, only by a microscope. Such synonymes are found throughout my larger work in great numbers, and have drawn upon me the reproach of “hair-splitting.” The fact I must acknowledge, but cannot admit it to be a reproach; for surely it is the proper vocation of a scientific writer on synonymes, not so much to distinguish words that merely resemble each other in meaning, as those that are apparently equivalent. The greater their apparent equivalence, the more difficult it is to grasp their essential difference, and the more indispensable the aid of a guide to synonymes. If, therefore, it be admitted, that words identical in meaning do not exist, and that it is morally impossible, if I may use the expression, that they should exist, the only questions are, whether, in such cases, it is worth while to search out their differences, and whether it is possible to find them out. Science will answer the first question, without hesitation, in the affirmative; and with respect to the second, there can at least be no presumption in making the attempt. A distinction is soon obtained when several words are contrasted with the word under consideration; and if these contrasted words are also synonymous with each other, it must follow, that the affinity of the several words in meaning is so close, as to permit their interchange, as synonymes, under all circumstances. Their differences are altogether unimportant with reference to speaking and writing, but highly important as far as the intimate and more refined knowledge of the language itself is concerned. It is on this account that hair-splitting is allowable. Can there be a doubt that a distinction will be slight in proportion as it has its origin in the individual feelings of those by whom a language is used? Such distinctions in synonymes are, consequently, most felt in one’s native language; it is only necessary that the feelings in which they have their origin should not be vague and unformed. In the introduction to the fourth part of my work I have evinced, I hope, sufficient liberality and tolerance with regard to the obligation of conforming to these hair-breadth distinctions, and selecting one’s expressions accordingly. So much in justification of those reprobated hair-splittings; those discoveries of atoms, or, as my deceased friend Bremi expressed it, keen discernment of atoms, which in my larger work, more devoted to science than to instruction, found their proper place; but in the present Hand-book, intended for the use of schools, especially in the art of writing Latin, my predilection for such nice distinctions would be sadly out of place. Distinctions of that sort I have, therefore, for the most part, omitted, but not with the intention of silently retracting them.
I here submit a few observations to the notice of schoolmasters. For the purposes of instruction, synonymes may be divided into three classes; the first embraces those which the scholar cannot too quickly learn to distinguish, because their affinity is merely apparent, arising from their being translated by the same word in the mother-tongue; for instance, liberi and infantes; animal and bestia; hærere and pendere; sumere and adimere; hostis and inimicus. The interchange of such synonymes may be counted a blunder of the same sort as that which is called a solecism. To the second class belong those synonymes which may be distinguished from each other with ease and certainty, but which are, at the same time, so nearly related in meaning, that the ancients themselves use them, without hesitation, as interchangeable; for instance, lascivus and petulans; parere and obedire; ater and niger; incipere and inchoare; mederi and sanare; vacuus and inanis; spernere and contemnere; tranquillus and quietus. As long as the scholar has to contend with the elements of grammar, the teacher may leave him in the erroneous opinion, that these expressions have exactly the same meaning; but, when further advanced, he must be taught to distinguish them, partly in order to accustom him to that propriety of expression which is necessary in writing Latin; partly, without reference to composition, as a very useful mental exercise. In the third class I rank those words whose differences are not to be ascertained without trouble, and cannot be deduced with full evidence from the old authors, and which, probably, were but dimly discerned even by the ancients themselves; for instance, lira and sulcus; remus and tonsa; pæne and prope; etiam and quoque; recordari and reminisci; lævus and sinister; velox and pernix; vesanus and vecors; fatigatus and fessus; collis and clivus. Such distinctions are of little or no consequence in composition, except when it is necessary to use synonymous terms in express opposition to each other; for instance, mare and amnis, in opp. to lacus and fluvius; metus and spes, in opp. to timor and fiducia: when such occasions occur, the richness of a language in synonymes is available. A more scrupulous exactness in this respect would appear to me arrant pedantry, and necessarily obstruct the free movement of the mind in writing. As a teacher, I should wish that the synonymes of the first sort should be distinguished by boys in the elementary classes; those of the second, I would introduce into the higher classes, and teach the scholar, when about fourteen, to observe their differences in the choice of expressions in composition; I would also explain them in the interpretation of an author, but with moderation, as a spur to thinking, not as a clog in reading. Those of the third class I would never introduce, except in explaining such passages as render their introduction unavoidable; for instance, when an author combines flumina et amnes, I would explain their difference to defend him from the suspicion of tautology.
I have consulted convenience of reference in interweaving the alphabetical index with the context. By this means any one can find at once the word of which he is in search, which a separate index would render impossible.
These arrangements, combined with an almost studied precision of expression, have enabled me to reduce the six volumes of my larger work on Synonymes (which fills, including the Supplement, more than one hundred and forty-three sheets) to this Abridgment, of about fifteen. The etymological part of my researches I reserve for a separate volume, of about the same size as the present, which will make its appearance as an Etymological Hand-book of the Latin language.
May the present publication, and that which I announce, meet with the same favorable and indulgent reception that has fallen to the share of my larger work with all its defects.
Erlangen, December, 1839.
A
Abdere, see Celare.
Abesse; Deesse; Deficere. 1. Abesse denotes absence as a local relation, ‘to be away’ from a place; but deesse denotes an absence by which a thing is rendered incomplete, and means ‘to fail,’ ‘to be wanting,’ in opp. to esse and superesse. Cic. Brut. 80. Calidio hoc unum, si nihil utilitatis habebat, abfuit, si opus erat, defuit. 2. Deesse denotes a completed (i. e. already existing), deficere a commencing state. Cic. Verr. i. 11. Vererer ne oratio deesset, ne vox viresque deficerent. (v. 339.)
Abnuere, see Negare.
Abolere (ἀπολέσαι) means ‘to annul,’ to ‘annihilate,’ and, as far as possible, to remove from the universe and cast into oblivion; but delere (διολέσαι, or δηλεῖν) ‘to destroy,’ to bring a thing to nought, and make it useless.
Abominari; Exsecrari; Detestari. Abominari means to recoil from, as of evil omen; and to avert a threatening evil by a ceremony, in opp. to omen accipere; exsecrari means to curse, when one would exclude a guilty person from human society as devoted to the infernal gods, in opp. to blessing; lastly, detestari (θέσσασθαι) means to curse, when one wishes to deprecate evil by an appeal to the gods against a dreaded person or thing, in opp. to praying in behalf of.
Abscondere, see Celare.
Absolvere, see Finire.
Abstinentia, see Modus.
Abundare; Redundare. Abundare denotes plenteousness in a good sense, as the symbol of full measure and affluence, like περιεῖναι, redundare is used in a bad sense, as a symbol of over-abundance and luxury, like περισσεύειν: of that which is abundans there is an ample supply at hand; that which is redundans is superfluous and might be dispensed with.
Abunde, see Satis.
Ac, see Et.
Accendere; Incendere; Inflammare; Comburere; Cremare. Accendere, incendere, and inflammare, mean ‘to set on fire:’ accendere, from without, and at a single point, like ἀνάπτειν [hence to light a torch, etc.]; incendere, from within, like ἐνδαίειν [hence to set fire to houses, villages]; inflammare, ‘to set on fire,’ either from without or from within, but with bright flames, like ἀναφλογίζειν; comburere and cremare mean ‘to burn up, or consume by fire;’ comburere, with a glowing heat, as the causative of ardere, like κατακαίειν; cremare, with bright flames, as the causative of flagrare like πιμπράναι. Hence, mortui cremantur on a bright blazing funeral pile; vivi comburuntur, Cic. Fam. x. 32. Verr. i. 33 and 38, in order to make the torture of that mode of dying felt the more. (iv. 250.)
Acceptus, see Gratus.
Accersere, see Arcessere.
Accidere; Evenire; Contigere; Obvenire; Obtingere. Accidere and evenire denote both favorable and unfavorable occurrences; but the accidentia, unexpected ones, overtaking us by surprise; the evenientia were expected, foreseen; contingere, obvenire, obtingere, are generally confined to fortunate occurrences. The accidentia are fortuitous, the evenientia result from foregoing acts or circumstances; the contingentia are the favors of Fortune; the obtingentia and obvenientia are the things that fall to one’s lot. Cic. Fam. vi. 21. Timebam, ne evenirent, quæ acciderunt: the word evenirent has a subjective reference to his foresight, the word acciderunt is entirely objective; the point of view taken by it being that of those who now manifest surprise. See also Tac. H. iv. 19, and Sen. Ep. 119. Scies plura mala contingere nobis quam accidere. (v. 339.)
Accipere, see Sumere.
Accire, see Arcessere.
Accusare, see Arguere.
Acer; Vehemens. Acer (ὠκύς) denotes eagerness in a good sense, as fire and energy, in opp. to frigidus, like ὀξύς: but vehemens (ἐχόμενος) in a bad sense, as heat and passion, in opp. to lenis; Cic. Or. ii. 49, 53, like σφοδρός. (iv. 450.)
Acerbus; Amarus. Acerbus (from κάρφω) means a biting bitterness, in opp. to mitis, like ὀξύς; amarus, a nauseous bitterness, in opp. to dulcis, like πικρός. Quintil. xi. 3. 169. Cic. Rep. iii. 8. Plin. H. N. xxvii. 9. Sen. Ir. i. 4. (vi. 4.)
Acervus; Congeries; Strues; Cumulus. 1. Acervus and congeries mean ‘heaps’ of homogeneous things collected and piled up in layers; acervus [from ἀγείρω], like σωρός, with arrangement, and mostly in a conical shape, but congeries, negligently, and altogether without regard to shape; strues denotes that something new is produced, and a determinate form given, serving a particular purpose; like θημών. Curt. viii. 7. 11. Passim acervos struesque accendebant; meaning by acervos ‘heaps’ or ‘piles,’ by strues ‘stacks’ of wood. 2. Cumulus (from ἀκμή) means strictly, not the heap itself, but the top, by which the heap is completed as a whole, like the key-stone, by which any thing first reaches its proper and complete height, almost like κορυφή; and it has this meaning particularly in cumulare, which is like κορυφοῦν. Compare Liv. xxii. 59. Superstantes cumulis cæsorum corporum, with Cannenses campos acervi Romanorum corporum tegunt: and xxiii. 5. Molibus ex humanorum corporum strue faciendis. (ii. 118.)
Achivi; Achæi; Achaius; Achaicus; Troius; Troicus. 1. Achivi are the Homeric Greeks, or Ἀχαῖοι; Achæi are either the inhabitants of Achaia, or, in the poets, the Greeks at large, as contemporaries of the Romans. Cic. Divin. i. 16. Cum Achivi cœpissent inter se strepere. Compare this with Cæcil. 20. Quod cum sibi Achæi patronum adoptarant. 2. Achaius is the adj. of Achivus. Hor. Od. i. 15. 37. Virg. Æn. ii. 462; but Achaicus is the adj. of Achæus. Cic. Att. i. 13. 3. Troius is the more select term, as adj. of the old heroic and Homeric Troja; Troicus, the usual adj. of the country Troas, without reference to the Trojan war. (v. 306.)
Acies; Acumen; Cacumen; Mucro; Cuspis. 1. Acies is the sharpness of a line adapted for cutting; acumen, of a tip or point adapted for sticking. Figuratively, the acies mentis is shown in the keen sifting of what is confused, in clear perception; the acumen mentis is the fathoming of that which is deeply hidden, in subtle discovery. 2. Acumen and cacumen mean a natural head or top; acumen, of a cone, beak, and so forth; cacumen, particularly that of a mountain: mucro and cuspis mean an artificial head, for the purpose of piercing and wounding; mucro, that of a sword, dagger, and so forth; cuspis, that of a spear, arrow, etc., like αἰχμή. (vi. 5.)
Acies, see Pugna.
Acta, see Ripa.
Actor; Comœdus; Ludio; Histrio. The generic term actor, and the specific terms comœdus and tragœdus, denote the player, as a respectable artist; but ludio, ludius, the comedian, the player, who makes acting his trade, with the accessory notion of commonness; lastly, histrio, sometimes the actor, sometimes the comedian, but mostly with the accessory notion of buffoonery and boasting. Cic. Sext. 54. Ipse ille maxime ludius, non solum spectator, sed actor et acroama. Rosc. Com. 10. Nemo ex pessimo histrione bonum comœdum fieri posse existimaret. Ep. ad Qu. Fr. i. a. E. Hortor ut tanquam poetæ boni et actores industrii solent, in extrema parte diligentissimus sis. Suet. Aug. 74. (v. 334.)
Acumen, see Acies.
Adamare, see Amare.
Adesse; Interesse; Præsentem esse. 1. Adesse means to be near a person or thing; but interesse, to assist in a transaction, to take a part in it. Cic. Verr. i. 40. Crimina ea, quæ notiora sunt his qui adsunt, quam nobis.. De illo nihil dixit, in quo interfuit. 2. Adesse denotes generally the presence in a circle to which we belong; præsentem esse, absolute, audible and visible presence. When an expected guest is within our walls, adest; he who is in the same room with us, præsens est. (v. 337.)
Adhuc; Hactenus; Hucusque. Adhuc refers to time, up to this moment; hactenus and hucusque have a local reference, up to this place, or this point.
Adigere, see Cogere.
Adimere, see Demere.
Adipisci, see Invenire.
Adjuvare, see Auxilium.
Admirari, see Vereri.
Admodum, see Perquam.
Adolere, see Accendere.
Adolescens, see Puer.
Adorare, see Vereri.
Adscendere, see Scandere.
Adsolere, see Solere.
Adspectus, Adspicere, see Videre.
Adulari, see Assentiri.
Aduncus, see Curvus.
Advena, see Externus.
Adventor, see Hospes.
Adversarius; Hostis; Inimicus. 1. Adversarius is the generic term for every opposer, in the field, in politics, in a court of judicature, like ἀντιστάτης. Hostis (from ἔχθω) is ‘the enemy’ in the field, and war, opp. to pacatus. Cic. Rep. ii. 3. Sen. Q. N. vi. 7. like πολέμιος; inimicus, ‘an enemy’ in heart, opp. to amicus, like ἐχθρός. Cic. Man. 10. Pompeius sæpius cum hoste conflixit, quam quisquam cum inimico concertavit. Phil. xi. 1. Verr. i. 15. Curt. vii. 10. Liv. xxii. 39. Nescio an infestior hic adversarius, quam ille hostis maneat. 2. Hostilis and inimicus denote states of hatred become habitual qualities; infestus and infensus only as temporary states; infestus (ἀνασπαστός?) applies to a quiescent state of aversion, like disaffected, unkind, and thus it is applied to inanimate things that threaten hostility; infensus (from πένθος) denotes a passionate state of mind, like enraged, and is therefore applicable to persons only. Tac. Ann. xv. 28. Non infensum, nedum hostili odio Corbulonis nomen habebatur. Cic. Verr. iii. 24. Sall. Cat. 19. Sen. N. Q. iii. pr. Animus luxuriæ non adversus tantum, sed et infestus. Liv. ii. 20. Tarquinium infesto spiculo petit; Tarquinius infenso cessit hosti. (iv. 393.)
Advocatus; Causidicus. Advocatus means in the writers of the silver age ‘a counsel’ in relation to his services and to his client, as his friend and assistant; causidicus, in relation to his station and profession, often with the contemptuous accessory notion of his being a hireling. (vi. 8.)
Ædes, see Templum.
Ædificium; Domus; Ædes; Familia. 1. Ædificium is the generic term for buildings of all sorts, like οἰκοδόμημα; domus, and ædes, ædium, mean ‘a dwelling-house;’ domus, as the residence and home of a family; ædes (αἴθω, αἴθουσα), as composed of several apartments, like δόμοι, δώματα. Virg. G. ii. 461. Ingentem foribus domus alta superbis mane salutantum totis vomit ædibus undam. (vi. 8.) 2. Domus denotes ‘a family’ in the patriarchal sense, as a separate society, of which the individuals are mutually connected; familia, in a political sense, as part of a gens, civitas, or populus. (v. 301.)
Æger; Ægrotus; Morbidus; Morbus; Valetudo; Invaletudo. 1. Æger is the generic term for every sort of illness and uneasiness, whether mental or physical; ægrotus and morbidus indicate bodily illness: ægrotus is applied particularly to men; morbidus, to brutes: the æger feels himself ill; the ægrotus and morbidus actually are so. 2. Morbus and valetudo denote an actual illness; morbus, objectively, that which attacks men; valetudo, subjectively, the state of the sick, though this distinction was introduced by writers of the silver age; invaletudo means only an indisposition. (iv. 172.)
Ægre, see Vix.
Ægritudo, see Cura.
Ægrotus, see Æger.
Æmulatio, see Imitatio.
Æqualis, see Æquus.
Æquor, see Mare.
Æquus; Par; Æqualis; Parilis; Compar; Impar; Dispar. 1. Æquum (from εἴκελος) is that of which its own component parts are alike, in opp. to varius, Cic. Verr. v. 49; par (from πείρω) is that which is like to some other person or thing, and stands in the same rank (on the same level) with it or him, in opp. to superior and inferior. Cic. Brut. 59, 215. Orat. ii. 52, 209. 39, 166. In æquo marte the battle between two parties is considered as a whole; in pari marte the fortune of one party is set against that of the other, and declared to be equal to it. 2. Par denotes similarity with respect to greatness, power, and value, or equality and proportion with regard to number, like ἴσος; æqualis refers to interior qualities, like ὅμοιος. The par is considered as in a state of activity, or, at least, as determined and prepared to measure himself with his match in contest; the æqualis, in a state of rest, and claiming merely comparison and equality as to rank. The paria are placed in opposition to each other, as rivals in the contest for pre-eminence; the æqualia are considered in a friendly relation to each other, in consequence of their common qualities and sympathies. Hence pariter means, in the same degree, ἴσα; æqualiter, in the same manner, ὁμοίως, ὁμῶς. Vell. Pat. ii. 124. 3. Par denotes quite like, parilis, nearly like, as a middle step between par and similis. 4. Par expresses equal to another, and hence may relate to only one side; compar, mutually equal, like finitimi and confines, ἐγγύς and σύνεγγυς. 5. Impar denotes inequality as to quantity, either arithmetical inequality with regard to number [= odd], or a relative inferiority as to strength; dispar refers to quality, without distinguishing on which side of the comparison the advantage lies. (iv. 77.)
Æquus; Planus; Campus. 1. Æquum (from εἴκελος) denotes that which is flat, a horizontal flatness, in opposition to that which rises or sinks, to superior, inferior, and acclivis. Cic. Fam. iii. 8. Orat. iii. 6. Tac. Agr. 35. Hist. iv. 23; planum (from πλάξ) denotes ‘evenness,’ in opp. to unevenness, to montosus, saxosus. Cic. Part. 10. Quintil. v. 10, 37. 21. Hence, figuratively, æquum denotes ‘justice,’ as injustice may be considered as beginning when one part is raised above another; in the same way planum denotes clearness and distinctness, where nothing rises to interrupt the view. 2. Æquor and planities denote a flat surface with regard to its form; campus, with regard to its position, as low-lands in opp. to high-lands. (iv. 71.)
Æquus animus, see Satis habere.
Aer, see Anima.
Ærarium; Fiscus. Ærarium is ‘the public treasury;’ fiscus (from πίθος, πιθάκνη), ‘the imperial treasury.’ Tac. Ann. vi. 2. Bona Sejani ablata ærario, ut in fiscum cogerentur; tanquam referret! (vi. 10.)
Ærumna, see Labor.
Æstimare, see Censere.
Æstuare, see Calere.
Æternus, see Continuus.
Affari, see Alloqui.
Affatim, see Satis.
Affinis, see Necessarius.
Affirmare, see Dicere.
Ager, see Rus and Villa.
Agere; Facere; Gerere; Opus; Factum; Age; I nunc; Degere. 1. Agere (ἄγειν) has an effect that exists in time only, like to do; facere, an effect that exists in space also, as to make. The acta are past as soon as the agens ceases, and remain invisible in the memory; the facta cannot properly be said to exist till the faciens ceases. Quintil. ii. 18. The agens is supposed to be in a state of activity of some kind; the faciens in a state of productive activity. 2. Agere means ‘to do’ something for one’s own interest; gerere (ἀγείρειν), for the interest of another, to execute a commission. Cic. Verr. i. 38. Quæ etiamsi voluntate Dolabellæ fiebant, per istum tamen omnia gerebantur. 3. Opus is the result of facere, as the work, ἔργον; factum is the result of agere, as the transaction; res gestæ are deeds [e. g. in war], πράξεις; acta are only political enactments. Cic. Att. xiv. 17. Multa de facto ac de re gesta; the former by the exertions of Amatius, the latter by his own wise and spirited animadversions through Dolabella. 4. Age, agedum, is an earnest exhortation, as ‘On, on!’ I nunc is an ironical exhortation, as ‘Go to!’ 5. Agere means to be active, and in the midst of business; degere, to live somewhere in a state of rest, in voluntary or involuntary inactivity. Tac. Ann. xv. 74. Deum honor principi non ante habetur, quam agere inter homines desierit, compared with iv. 54. Certus procul urbe degere. (v. 327.)