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полная версияThe Foundations of the Origin of Species

Чарльз Дарвин
The Foundations of the Origin of Species

Points of Resemblance between “Races” and “Species 259 .

Races and reputed species agree in some respects, although differing from causes which, we have seen, we can in some degree understand, in the fertility and “trueness” of their offspring. In the first place, there is no clear sign by which to distinguish races from species, as is evident from the great difficulty experienced by naturalists in attempting to discriminate them. As far as external characters are concerned, many of the races which are descended from the same stock differ far more than true species of the same genus; look at the willow-wrens, some of which skilful ornithologists can hardly distinguish from each other except by their nests; look at the wild swans, and compare the distinct species of these genera with the races of domestic ducks, poultry, and pigeons; and so again with plants, compare the cabbages, almonds, peaches and nectarines, &c. with the species of many genera. St Hilaire has even remarked that there is a greater difference in size between races, as in dogs (for he believes all have descended from one stock), than between the species of any one genus; nor is this surprising, considering that amount of food and consequently of growth is the element of change over which man has most power. I may refer to a former statement, that breeders believe the growth of one part or strong action of one function causes a decrease in other parts; for this seems in some degree analogous to the law of “organic compensation260,” which many naturalists believe holds good. To give an instance of this law of compensation, – those species of Carnivora which have the canine teeth greatly developed have certain molar teeth deficient; or again, in that division of the Crustaceans in which the tail is much developed, the thorax is little so, and the converse. The points of difference between different races is often strikingly analogous to that between species of the same genus: trifling spots or marks of colour261 (as the bars on pigeons’ wings) are often preserved in races of plants and animals, precisely in the same manner as similar trifling characters often pervade all the species of a genus, and even of a family. Flowers in varying their colours often become veined and spotted and the leaves become divided like true species: it is known that the varieties of the same plant never have red, blue and yellow flowers, though the hyacinth makes a very near approach to an exception262; and different species of the same genus seldom, though sometimes they have flowers of these three colours. Dun-coloured horses having a dark stripe down their backs, and certain domestic asses having transverse bars on their legs, afford striking examples of a variation analogous in character to the distinctive marks of other species of the same genus.

External characters of Hybrids and Mongrels

There is, however, as it appears to me, a more important method of comparison between species and races, namely the character of the offspring263 when species are crossed and when races are crossed: I believe, in no one respect, except in sterility, is there any difference. It would, I think, be a marvellous fact, if species have been formed by distinct acts of creation, that they should act upon each other in uniting, like races descended from a common stock. In the first place, by repeated crossing one species can absorb and wholly obliterate the characters of another, or of several other species, in the same manner as one race will absorb by crossing another race. Marvellous, that one act of creation should absorb another or even several acts of creation! The offspring of species, that is hybrids, and the offspring of races, that is mongrels, resemble each other in being either intermediate in character (as is most frequent in hybrids) or in resembling sometimes closely one and sometimes the other parent; in both the offspring produced by the same act of conception sometimes differ in their degree of resemblance; both hybrids and mongrels sometimes retain a certain part or organ very like that of either parent, both, as we have seen, become in succeeding generations variable; and this tendency to vary can be transmitted by both; in both for many generations there is a strong tendency to reversion to their ancestral form. In the case of a hybrid laburnum and of a supposed mongrel vine different parts of the same plants took after each of their two parents. In the hybrids from some species, and in the mongrel of some races, the offspring differ according as which of the two species, or of the two races, is the father (as in the common mule and hinny) and which the mother. Some races will breed together, which differ so greatly in size, that the dam often perishes in labour; so it is with some species when crossed; when the dam of one species has borne offspring to the male of another species, her succeeding offspring are sometimes stained (as in Lord Morton’s mare by the quagga, wonderful as the fact264 is) by this first cross; so agriculturists positively affirm is the case when a pig or sheep of one breed has produced offspring by the sire of another breed.

Summary of second chapter 265

Let us sum up this second chapter. If slight variations do occur in organic beings in a state of nature; if changes of condition from geological causes do produce in the course of ages effects analogous to those of domestication on any, however few, organisms; and how can we doubt it, – from what is actually known, and from what may be presumed, since thousands of organisms taken by man for sundry uses, and placed in new conditions, have varied. If such variations tend to be hereditary; and how can we doubt it, – when we see shades of expression, peculiar manners, monstrosities of the strangest kinds, diseases, and a multitude of other peculiarities, which characterise and form, being inherited, the endless races (there are 1200 kinds of cabbages266) of our domestic plants and animals. If we admit that every organism maintains its place by an almost periodically recurrent struggle; and how can we doubt it, – when we know that all beings tend to increase in a geometrical ratio (as is instantly seen when the conditions become for a time more favourable); whereas on an average the amount of food must remain constant, if so, there will be a natural means of selection, tending to preserve those individuals with any slight deviations of structure more favourable to the then existing conditions, and tending to destroy any with deviations of an opposite nature. If the above propositions be correct, and there be no law of nature limiting the possible amount of variation, new races of beings will, – perhaps only rarely, and only in some few districts, – be formed.

 

Limits of Variation

That a limit to variation does exist in nature is assumed by most authors, though I am unable to discover a single fact on which this belief is grounded267. One of the commonest statements is that plants do not become acclimatised; and I have even observed that kinds not raised by seed, but propagated by cuttings, &c., are instanced. A good instance has, however, been advanced in the case of kidney beans, which it is believed are now as tender as when first introduced. Even if we overlook the frequent introduction of seed from warmer countries, let me observe that as long as the seeds are gathered promiscuously from the bed, without continual observation and careful selection of those plants which have stood the climate best during their whole growth, the experiment of acclimatisation has hardly been begun. Are not all those plants and animals, of which we have the greatest number of races, the oldest domesticated? Considering the quite recent progress268 of systematic agriculture and horticulture, is it not opposed to every fact, that we have exhausted the capacity of variation in our cattle and in our corn, – even if we have done so in some trivial points, as their fatness or kind of wool? Will any one say, that if horticulture continues to flourish during the next few centuries, that we shall not have numerous new kinds of the potato and Dahlia? But take two varieties of each of these plants, and adapt them to certain fixed conditions and prevent any cross for 5000 years, and then again vary their conditions; try many climates and situations; and who269 will predict the number and degrees of difference which might arise from these stocks? I repeat that we know nothing of any limit to the possible amount of variation, and therefore to the number and differences of the races, which might be produced by the natural means of selection, so infinitely more efficient than the agency of man. Races thus produced would probably be very “true”; and if from having been adapted to different conditions of existence, they possessed different constitutions, if suddenly removed to some new station, they would perhaps be sterile and their offspring would perhaps be infertile. Such races would be undistinguishable from species. But is there any evidence that the species, which surround us on all sides, have been thus produced? This is a question which an examination of the economy of nature we might expect would answer either in the affirmative or negative270.

CHAPTER III
ON THE VARIATION OF INSTINCTS AND OTHER MENTAL ATTRIBUTES UNDER DOMESTICATION AND IN STATE OF NATURE; ON THE DIFFICULTIES IN THIS SUBJECT; AND ON ANALOGOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH RESPECT TO CORPOREAL STRUCTURES

Variation of mental attributes under domestication

I have as yet only alluded to the mental qualities which differ greatly in different species. Let me here premise that, as will be seen in the Second Part, there is no evidence and consequently no attempt to show that all existing organisms have descended from any one common parent-stock, but that only those have so descended which, in the language of naturalists, are clearly related to each other. Hence the facts and reasoning advanced in this chapter do not apply to the first origin of the senses271, or of the chief mental attributes, such as of memory, attention, reasoning, &c., &c., by which most or all of the great related groups are characterised, any more than they apply to the first origin of life, or growth, or the power of reproduction. The application of such facts as I have collected is merely to the differences of the primary mental qualities and of the instincts in the species272 of the several great groups. In domestic animals every observer has remarked in how great a degree, in the individuals of the same species, the dispositions, namely courage, pertinacity, suspicion, restlessness, confidence, temper, pugnaciousness, affection, care of their young, sagacity, &c., &c., vary. It would require a most able metaphysician to explain how many primary qualities of the mind must be changed to cause these diversities of complex dispositions. From these dispositions being inherited, of which the testimony is unanimous, families and breeds arise, varying in these respects. I may instance the good and ill temper of different stocks of bees and of horses, – the pugnacity and courage of game fowls, – the pertinacity of certain dogs, as bull-dogs, and the sagacity of others, – for restlessness and suspicion compare a wild rabbit reared with the greatest care from its earliest age with the extreme tameness of the domestic breed of the same animal. The offspring of the domestic dogs which have run wild in Cuba273, though caught quite young, are most difficult to tame, probably nearly as much so as the original parent-stock from which the domestic dog descended. The habitual “periods” of different families of the same species differ, for instance, in the time of year of reproduction, and the period of life when the capacity is acquired, and the hour of roosting (in Malay fowls), &c., &c. These periodical habits are perhaps essentially corporeal, and may be compared to nearly similar habits in plants, which are known to vary extremely. Consensual movements (as called by Müller) vary and are inherited, – such as the cantering and ambling paces in horses, the tumbling of pigeons, and perhaps the handwriting, which is sometimes so similar between father and sons, may be ranked in this class. Manners, and even tricks which perhaps are only peculiar manners, according to W. Hunter and my father, are distinctly inherited in cases where children have lost their parent in early infancy. The inheritance of expression, which often reveals the finest shades of character, is familiar to everyone.

Again the tastes and pleasures of different breeds vary, thus the shepherd-dog delights in chasing the sheep, but has no wish to kill them, – the terrier (see Knight) delights in killing vermin, and the spaniel in finding game. But it is impossible to separate their mental peculiarities in the way I have done: the tumbling of pigeons, which I have instanced as a consensual movement, might be called a trick and is associated with a taste for flying in a close flock at a great height. Certain breeds of fowls have a taste for roosting in trees. The different actions of pointers and setters might have been adduced in the same class, as might the peculiar manner of hunting of the spaniel. Even in the same breed of dogs, namely in fox-hounds, it is the fixed opinion of those best able to judge that the different pups are born with different tendencies; some are best to find their fox in the cover; some are apt to run straggling, some are best to make casts and to recover the lost scent, &c.; and that these peculiarities undoubtedly are transmitted to their progeny. Or again the tendency to point might be adduced as a distinct habit which has become inherited, – as might the tendency of a true sheep dog (as I have been assured is the case) to run round the flock instead of directly at them, as is the case with other young dogs when attempted to be taught. The "transandantes" sheep274 in Spain, which for some centuries have been yearly taken a journey of several hundred miles from one province to another, know when the time comes, and show the greatest restlessness (like migratory birds in confinement), and are prevented with difficulty from starting by themselves, which they sometimes do, and find their own way. There is a case on good evidence275 of a sheep which, when she lambed, would return across a mountainous country to her own birth-place, although at other times of year not of a rambling disposition. Her lambs inherited this same disposition, and would go to produce their young on the farm whence their parent came; and so troublesome was this habit that the whole family was destroyed.

These facts must lead to the conviction, justly wonderful as it is, that almost infinitely numerous shades of disposition, of tastes, of peculiar movements, and even of individual actions, can be modified or acquired by one individual and transmitted to its offspring. One is forced to admit that mental phenomena (no doubt through their intimate connection with the brain) can be inherited, like infinitely numerous and fine differences of corporeal structure. In the same manner as peculiarities of corporeal structure slowly acquired or lost during mature life (especially cognisant «?» in disease), as well as congenital peculiarities, are transmitted; so it appears to be with the mind. The inherited paces in the horse have no doubt been acquired by compulsion during the lives of the parents: and temper and tameness may be modified in a breed by the treatment which the individuals receive. Knowing that a pig has been taught to point, one would suppose that this quality in pointer-dogs was the simple result of habit, but some facts, with respect to the occasional appearance of a similar quality in other dogs, would make one suspect that it originally appeared in a less perfect degree, “by chance,” that is from a congenital tendency276 in the parent of the breed of pointers. One cannot believe that the tumbling, and high flight in a compact body, of one breed of pigeons has been taught; and in the case of the slight differences in the manner of hunting in young fox-hounds, they are doubtless congenital. The inheritance of the foregoing and similar mental phenomena ought perhaps to create less surprise, from the reflection that in no case do individual acts of reasoning, or movements, or other phenomena connected with consciousness, appear to be transmitted. An action, even a very complicated one, when from long practice it is performed unconsciously without any effort (and indeed in the case of many peculiarities of manners opposed to the will) is said, according to a common expression, to be performed “instinctively.” Those cases of languages, and of songs, learnt in early childhood and quite forgotten, being perfectly repeated during the unconsciousness of illness, appear to me only a few degrees less wonderful than if they had been transmitted to a second generation277.

 

Hereditary habits compared with instincts

The chief characteristics of true instincts appear to be their invariability and non-improvement during the mature age of the individual animal: the absence of knowledge of the end, for which the action is performed, being associated, however, sometimes with a degree of reason; being subject to mistakes and being associated with certain states of the body or times of the year or day. In most of these respects there is a resemblance in the above detailed cases of the mental qualities acquired or modified during domestication. No doubt the instincts of wild animals are more uniform than those habits or qualities modified or recently acquired under domestication, in the same manner and from the same causes that the corporeal structure in this state is less uniform than in beings in their natural conditions. I have seen a young pointer point as fixedly, the first day it was taken out, as any old dog; Magendie says this was the case with a retriever which he himself reared: the tumbling of pigeons is not probably improved by age: we have seen that in the case above given that the young sheep inherited the migratory tendency to their particular birth-place the first time they lambed. This last fact offers an instance of a domestic instinct being associated with a state of body; as do the “transandantes” sheep with a time of year. Ordinarily the acquired instincts of domestic animals seem to require a certain degree of education (as generally in pointers and retrievers) to be perfectly developed: perhaps this holds good amongst wild animals in rather a greater degree than is generally supposed; for instance, in the singing of birds, and in the knowledge of proper herbs in Ruminants. It seems pretty clear that bees transmit knowledge from generation to generation. Lord Brougham278 insists strongly on ignorance of the end proposed being eminently characteristic of true instincts; and this appears to me to apply to many acquired hereditary habits; for instance, in the case of the young pointer alluded to before, which pointed so steadfastly the first day that we were obliged several times to carry him away279. This puppy not only pointed at sheep, at large white stones, and at every little bird, but likewise “backed” the other pointers: this young dog must have been as unconscious for what end he was pointing, namely to facilitate his master’s killing game to eat, as is a butterfly which lays her eggs on a cabbage, that her caterpillars would eat the leaves. So a horse that ambles instinctively, manifestly is ignorant that he performs that peculiar pace for the ease of man; and if man had never existed, he would never have ambled. The young pointer pointing at white stones appears to be as much a mistake of its acquired instinct, as in the case of flesh-flies laying their eggs on certain flowers instead of putrifying meat. However true the ignorance of the end may generally be, one sees that instincts are associated with some degree of reason; for instance, in the case of the tailor-bird, who spins threads with which to make her nest «yet» will use artificial threads when she can procure them280; so it has been known that an old pointer has broken his point and gone round a hedge to drive out a bird towards his master281.

There is one other quite distinct method by which the instincts or habits acquired under domestication may be compared with those given by nature, by a test of a fundamental kind; I mean the comparison of the mental powers of mongrels and hybrids. Now the instincts, or habits, tastes, and dispositions of one breed of animals, when crossed with another breed, for instance a shepherd-dog with a harrier, are blended and appear in the same curiously mixed degree, both in the first and succeeding generations, exactly as happens when one species is crossed with another282. This would hardly be the case if there was any fundamental difference between the domestic and natural instinct283; if the former were, to use a metaphorical expression, merely superficial.

259This section seems not to correspond closely with any in the Origin, Ed. i.; in some points it resembles pp. 15, 16, also the section on analogous variation in distinct species, Origin, Ed. i. p. 159, vi. p. 194.
260The law of compensation is discussed in the Origin, Ed. i. p. 147, vi. p. 182.
261«Note in original.» Boitard and Corbié on outer edging red in tail of bird, – so bars on wing, white or black or brown, or white edged with black or «illegible»: analogous to marks running through genera but with different colours. Tail coloured in pigeons.
262«Note in original.» Oxalis and Gentian. «In Gentians blue, yellow and reddish colours occur. In Oxalis yellow, purple, violet and pink.»
263This section corresponds roughly to that on Hybrids and Mongrels compared independently of their fertility, Origin, Ed. i. p. 272, vi. p. 403. The discussion on Gärtner’s views, given in the Origin, is here wanting. The brief mention of prepotency is common to them both.
264See Animals and Plants, Ed. ii. vol. I. p. 435. The phenomenon of Telegony, supposed to be established by this and similar cases, is now generally discredited in consequence of Ewart’s experiments.
265The section on p. is an appendix to the summary.
266I do not know the authority for this statement.
267In the Origin no limit is placed to variation as far as I know.
268«Note in original.» History of pigeons shows increase of peculiarities during last years.
269Compare an obscure passage in the Essay of 1842, p. .
270«Note in original.» Certainly «two pages in the MS.» ought to be here introduced, viz., difficulty in forming such organ, as eye, by selection. «In the Origin, Ed. i., a chapter on Difficulties on Theory follows that on Laws of Variation, and precedes that on Instinct: this was also the arrangement in the Essay of 1842; whereas in the present Essay Instinct follows Variation and precedes Difficulties.»
271A similar proviso occurs in the chapter on instinct in Origin, Ed. i. p. 207, vi. p. 319.
272The discussion occurs later in Chapter VII of the Origin, Ed. i. than in the present Essay, where moreover it is fuller in some respects.
273In the margin occurs the name of Poeppig. In Var. under Dom., Ed. ii. vol. I. p. 28, the reference to Poeppig on the Cuban dogs contains no mention of the wildness of their offspring.
274«Note in original.» Several authors.
275In the margin “Hogg” occurs as authority for this fact. For the reference, see p. 17, note 4.
276In the Origin, Ed. i., he speaks more decidedly against the belief that instincts are hereditary habits, see for instance pp. 209, 214, Ed. vi. pp. 321, 327. He allows, however, something to habit (p. 216).
277A suggestion of Hering’s and S. Butler’s views on memory and inheritance. It is not, however, implied that Darwin was inclined to accept these opinions.
278Lord Brougham’s Dissertations on Subjects of Science, etc., 1839, p. 27.
279This case is more briefly given in the Origin, Ed. i. p. 213, vi. p. 326. The simile of the butterfly occurs there also.
280“A little dose, as Pierre Huber expresses it, of judgment or reason, often comes into play.” Origin, Ed. i. p. 208, vi. p. 320.
281In the margin is written “Retriever killing one bird.” This refers to the cases given in the Descent of Man, 2nd Ed. (in 1 vol.) p. 78, of a retriever being puzzled how to deal with a wounded and a dead bird, killed the former and carried both at once. This was the only known instance of her wilfully injuring game.
282See Origin, Ed. i. p. 214, vi. p. 327.
283«Note in original.» Give some definition of instinct, or at least give chief attributes. «In Origin, Ed. i. p. 207, vi. p. 319, Darwin refuses to define instinct.» The term instinct is often used in «a» sense which implies no more than that the animal does the action in question. Faculties and instincts may I think be imperfectly separated. The mole has the faculty of scratching burrows, and the instinct to apply it. The bird of passage has the faculty of finding its way and the instinct to put it in action at certain periods. It can hardly be said to have the faculty of knowing the time, for it can possess no means, without indeed it be some consciousness of passing sensations. Think over all habitual actions and see whether faculties and instincts can be separated. We have faculty of waking in the night, if an instinct prompted us to do something at certain hour of night or day. Savages finding their way. Wrangel’s account – probably a faculty inexplicable by the possessor. There are besides faculties “means,” as conversion of larvæ into neuters and queens. I think all this generally implied, anyhow useful. «This discussion, which does not occur in the Origin, is a first draft of that which follows in the text, p. 123.»
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